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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
This appeal is taken from consolidated litigation ansmg from the construction and
installation of a manure handling system at a Canyon County dairy operated by the
Plaintiffs/Appellants Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC (hereinafter referred to as
"DeGroot"). Beltman Construction, Inc., d/b/a Beltman Welding and Construction (hereinafter
referred to as "Beltman") was the general contractor for the job. Beltman subcontracted with
Stan.dley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. (hereinafter referred to as "Standley") and
Standley installed the manure handling equipment. 1. Houle & Fils, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "Houle") manufactured the manure handling equipment which was installed at the DeGroot
dairy. The manure handling equipment worked initially upon start-up but maintenance problems
arose thereafter. As a resulL DeGroot initiated litigation against Standley and Houle. DeGroot
then initiated litigation against Beltman and Beltman brought a third party complaint against
Standley. The later filed actions were consolidated into the initial litigation.
B. PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

The initial litigation, or DeGroots' direct litigation against Standley, (hereafter referred to
as the "DeGroot case:') involved DeGroots' filing of a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on
September 12,2001 against Standley and Houle, alleging claims and causes of action for breach
of contract, breach of express and implied \varranties, rescission of contract violation of the
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Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and damages. 1 Thereafter, DeGroot filed a First l\mended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 21, 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial on May 2, 2003, against Standley and Houle. 2
Standley moved for summary judgment on the claims and causes of action alleged by
DeGroot in their Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on January 3 L 2005. 3
Standley was granted summary judgment on all claims and causes of action asserted against it
pursuant to an Order entered March 22, 2005. 4

The Order granting summary judgment to

Standley was further confirmed pursuant to entry of an Order Confirming Summary Judgment
entered on March 28, 2005. 5 Thereafter, on April 27, 2007, DeGroot moved for reconsideration
of the Order granting summary judgment to Standley.6 DeGroot's motion to reconsider was
denied. 7
Subsequent to the district court's granting of summary judgment to Standley on
DeGroot's claims, but before Standley obtained sUlID11ary judgment on its Counterclaim, 8
DeGroot initiated a separate action against Beltman, which litigation was consolidated with the
DeGroot case after Standley obtained summary judgment on its Counterclaim. 9

DeGroot's

litigation against Beltman consisted of claims and causes of action for breach of contract breach

1

6

8

R . VII
o. , pp.

j" "j
k5-5~.

R. Vol. 1, pp. 33 -46; 65-76.
R. Vol. 1, pp. 111-179
R. Vol. 2, pp. 374-376
R. Vol. 2, pp. 377-379
R. Vol. 3, pp. 556-562; R. Vol. 4, pp. 563-607
R. Vol. 4, pp.765-767
Standley'S Counterclaim was handled by different legal counsel than the attorneys who defended
Standley against DeGroot's claims. Standley has submitted a separate Respondent's Brief regarding
the Counterclaim issues on appeal.
Supp. R., pp. 43-52: 53-55: 67-71
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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of implied warranties, rescission of
contract, lliid negligence. Beltman, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial against Third Party Defendants Standley and Houle. lO Beltman alleged claims and causes
of action against Standley for breach of contract, rescission, breach of warranties, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act. I I Beltman next filed its First Amended Third Party Complaint adding a claim of negligence
against Standley.

Ultimately, Standley obtained summary judgment on the claims DeGroot

obtained by an assignment from Beltman due to the district court's ruling that DeGroot was not a
third party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman. 12
After Beltman filed its third party action against Standley, DeGroot settled the litigation
with Beltman and took an assignment from Beltman of its third party claims and causes of action
against Standley. Standley then filed its third party motion for summary judgment on
February 2 L 2007.13 Standley's third party motion for summary judgment \vas denied on April
30, 2007, however, the district court noted in its Order that DeGroot, as assignee of the Beltman
third party claims, voluntarily \vithdrew the negligence and violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act claims as to all Defendants. 14 Standley next moved for partial summary judgment
on the claims assigned to DeGroot, except for those claims previously voluntarily withdrawn by
10
11

12

U
14

Supp. R., pp. 56 - 66.
Id.
Beltman asserted several of the same causes of action against Houle in its Third-Party Complaint that
it asserted against Standley. On March 21,2007, Houle moved for summary judgment as to Beltman's
claims asserted against it arguing as did Standley, that summary judgment was proper given that, as a
matter of law, DeGroot was not a third party beneficiary of the contract behveen Standley and
Beltman. The district court entered an Order granting summary judgment in Houle's favor on July 24,
2007. See R., Vol. 4, pp.740-742
R. Vol. 2, pp. 389-391; R. Vol. 3, pp. 392-482
R. Vol. 4, pp. 612-615
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DeGroot. ls At oral argument, Standley moved to convert its partial summary judgment to a full
summary judgment and thereafter an Order Granting Standley Trenching, Inc.'s Complete
Motion for Summary Judgment As to All Claims and Causes of Action Stated In Beltman
Construction Inc.'s Third Party Complaint was entered on November 8, 2011. 16
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

DeGroot closed on a purchase of real property located in Melba, Idaho, in 1998 that they
intended to use for a dairy operation milking up to 2,250

COWS.

l7

DeGroot obtained a design for

his dairy and entered into a written contract with Beltman to build the dairy.18

Standley

subcontracted with Beltman for the manure handling system, \vhich was to be installed as part of
the dairy construction process.

DeGroot did not have any contractual relationship with any

vendors perfonning subcontract work on the dairy project, including Standley. 19
Beltman subcontracted vV'ith Standley at the direction of DeGroot. The selection of the
manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle was made by DeGroot. 20 The total bid
Standley submitted to Beltman was $233,604.80, of which $174,004.80 was for the equipment
and $59,600.00 was for the construction of the manure handling system?] Standley'S bid,
refened to as the "bid contract," was verbally accepted by Beltman and constitutes the primary
document defining and outlining the work Standley \vas to perform on the dairy project. 22

R . \T'0.),
1 ~ pp. ~68
I
- 76"
.J
J6 R. Vol. 5, pp. 907-910
17 R. Vol. 2, p. 208
lS ld., at p.209
19 !d., at pp. 209-210
2C R. Vol. 5, pp. 789
~~ ld., at pp. 803-806
R., Vol. 5, p. 793
15
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The dairy opened in approximately April of2000.23 DeGroot paid Beltman in full for all
the work performed on the dairy, including the work by Standley.24 As more cows were moved
onto the dairy, a dispute arose as to the installation and functionality of the manure handling
system?5 DeGroot attempted to "revoke its acceptance" of the contract between Beltman and
Standley in June of 2001. 26

Regarding lack of privity of contract between DeGroot and

Standley, Charles DeGroot admitted that he did not have a contractual relationship with
Standley, nor did he provide any plans or specifications directly to Standley.27 Kurt Standley
also testified that he understood that he was contracting with Beltman, not DeGroot. 28 The only
contract DeGroot entered into for the construction of the dairy was with the general contractor,
Beltman. 29 Other than Beltman's acceptance of Standley's bid on the DeGroot dairy project,
there is no written or oral contract betiveen Standley and Beltman concerning the work Standley
was to perforn1 pursuant to its bid submitted to Beltman on the project. 30 Charles DeGroot also
understood that Standley was a subcontractor to Beltman on the project. 3l Standley's work on
the project installing the manure disposal system started in the summer of 1999 and continued
through the start-up of the dairy in April, 2000.32 A fundamental component of Standley's bid
\)"as the use of compost for bedding in the free stalls of the dairy barn.33 However, when the

:k

Jd., at p.788
Jd., at p. 795
Jd., at p. 788
Jd., at p. 809
Jd., at p.210
R. VoL 1, p. 116.
Jd., at pp. 172, 177-178
Jd., at p. 145
Jd., at p. 172
Id.~ at pp. 174, 177

:~~

Id.~atp.150

23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
"1
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dairy began operation in April, 2000 a pit-run mixture of sand and gravel, not compost, was used
for bedding in the free stalls. 34 The sand and gravel was flushed out with the manure and
interfered with the proper operation of the manure handling system. 35 In the first case filed by
DeGroot, even though there was no contract between DeGroot and Standley, DeGroot sought
remedies for breach of contract or rescission and other claims against St3..cl1dley (and Houle as the
manufacturer of the manure handling equipment) rather than against the general contractor,
Beltman.
DeGroot argued that it was a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to
Beltman in an attempt to overcome the lack of privity of contract. 36 Standley's bid contract was
made to Beltman and does not contain any language showing an intention by Standley or
Beltman that DeGroot was to expressly benefit from Standley's bid submitted to Beltman.
DeGroot filed a second lawsuit against Beltman 18 days before the district court granted
Standley summary judgment on all of DeGroot's claims alleged against Standley in the initial
litigation. 37
Beltman settled the lawsuit DeGroot filed against it by stipulating to a judgment in favor
DeGroot in the amount of $964,255.36; however, as Stanley Beltman testified, Beltman did
not pay any money in relation to the stipulated judgment resolving that lawsuit. Beltman simply
assigned its rights under its Third Party Complaint against Standley and Houle to DeGroot. 38
Beltman's Third P3..crty Complaint states the exact same claims and causes of action as DeGroot's

-,4

35
36

~~/
38

Td at p. 1-4
)
Jd., atpp. 146, 154
R. Vol. 3, pp. 556-562
R. \'01. 2~ p. 374; Supp. R.~ p. 43
R., Vol. 5, pp. 796: 879 888

11.,
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Second i\mended Complaint. 39 DeGroot's' position is that its damages and Beltman's damages
are the same. 40 Beltman however, is a construction company, not a dairyman operating a dairy.
Beltman does not have special damages derivative of lost milk production, increased veterinarian
bills, increased mastitis in the herd, increased mortality rates of cows due to unsanitary
conditions, or increased labor costs due to operation of the system installed by Standley.41 Nor
did Beltman incur costs associated with repairing or replacing the system installed by Standley.
These are all alleged damages that could only be incurred by DeGroot.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL 42
A. On DeGroot's affirmative claims against Standley:

1. Vv1hether the district court erred in finding that DeGroot was not a Third Party
Beneficiary of the bid contract between Standley and Beltman.
2. 'J"vbether the district court erred in holding that DeGroot could not maintain
warranty claims against Standley.
3. wnether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on
DeGroot's claims claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
4. wnether the district court erred in grili'1ting summary judgment to Standley on

DeGroot's claim alleging violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
5. \Vhether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on
DeGroot's claim of rescission of contract against Standley.

B. On DeGroot's assigned claims from Beltman:

39

40
41

40

Supp. Rec., pp. 56 - 66
R. Vol. 5, p. 839, p. 898
Jd., at pp. 858-859
The issue of whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on its
Counterclaim and claim for attorney fees therein is being addressed in a separate Respondent's brief
by Standley's attorney who handled that aspect of the litigation before the district court.
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1. \Xlhether the district court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claims as an assignee of
Beltman against Standley.
C. \\'hether the district court erred in awarding Standley attorney fees and costs m
defending the claims asserted by DeGroot.

III.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

'Vhether attorney fees on appeal should be awarded to Standley.
Standley respectfully submits that DeGroot's statement of Issues on Appeal are
insufficient, incomplete or raise additional issues as it fails to address recovery by Standley of its
attorney fees on appeal. Standley therefore requests its attorney fees and costs associated with
defending against this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 54(d) and 54(e), LA.R. 35(b)(5) and 41, and all other applicable state law.
IV.
ARGUMENT
A. STAKDLEY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEGROOT'S
AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST STANDLEY STATED IN THE
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
1. Standard of Review.

On a motion for SUJ11..mary judgment "[a]ll disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138
Idaho 443, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003) citing In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d
1100 (2002). If the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. j1cCoy v. Lyons. 120
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Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). Summary judgment is "appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Id.

If "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a

question oflaw remains, over which [the court] exercises free review." Id.
If the defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of
material fact exists with regard to an element of the plaintiffs case, the plaintiff must establish
the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v.
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272-73, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994).

In order to forestall summary

judgment in that case, the plaintiff must do more than present a scintilla of evidence; the plaintiff
must submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact and
that judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate. Petricel'ich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92
Idaho 865, 87l, 452 P.2d 362 (1969); G & _M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,
808 P.2d 851 (1991).
Summary judgment must be entered when a nonmoving party fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that
party \vill bear the burden of proof at trial. "In such a situation, there can be no 'genuine issue as
to any material fact' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex C01P. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 956, 842
P.2d 288 (CtApp. 1992).
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2. DeGroot is not a third-party beneficiarY of Standlev's bid to Reitman.
Standley prevailed against DeGroot's claims in the initial litigation due to the lack of
contractual privity between DeGroot and Standley.

DeGroot, as owner of the dairy project

contracted with Beltman, the general contractor for the project. DeGroot agrees that he did not
have a direct contractual relationship with Standley.43 Absent direct contractual privity, DeGroot
looks to the bid contract between Standley and Beltman as the source document for which
DeGroot was to be an intended beneficiary.

DeGroot cites statutory law in support of his

proposition, which provides:
Enforcement by beneficiary. A contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time
before the parties thereto rescind it.

I.e. §29-102.
However, interpretation of the contract must by necessity occur before leaping to a
conclusion as to whether or not a third party was intended to benefit from the contract.
Standley's bid contract to Beltman should be reviewed within the familiar rules of contract
interpretation, i.e., if the contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination of the contract's
meaning and legal effect are questions of law and the intent of the parties is to be detennined
from the plain meaning of the contract's wording. City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity, 126
Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995). A question of fact over the interpretation of the contract only
arises when the contract is deemed ambiguous. !d. The bid contract is not ambiguous. The bid
contract clearly outlines the job, materials and pricing that Standley "bid" to Beltman. The only
reference whatsoever to the name "DeGroot" occurs on the first page of the bid contract as a

43
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reference to the project name. 44 The bid contract contains no wording VI-hatsoever to the effect
that Charles DeGroot, Eamest DeGroot, or DeGroot Farms, LLC are to be deemed as
beneficiaries of Standley's bid to Beltman. 45
In order for DeGroot to recover on a third party beneficiary claim, it must be shown that
the bid contract was made for DeGroot's direct benefit and no recover can be made if DeGroot is
merely an incidental beneficiary. Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331,372 P.2d 414 (1962).
Because the bid contract is relied upon by DeGroot for authority to recover as a third party
beneficiary, the bid contract must be strictly construed in favor of Standley, i.e., the person
against whom liability is asserted. Id., at pp. 337,418

This Court has held that, "the test for

determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary is whether the agreement reflects an
intent to benefit the third party." Partout v. Halper, 145 Idaho 683,183 P.3d 771 (2008); citing,
Idaho Pov.'er Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112,90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004).

A plain reading of the bid contract fails to show any intent to benefit DeGroot. The mere
indication stated on the bid contract that the bid is being made in regard to the "DeGroot Dairy"
identifies the job and does not expressly state any intent by Standley or Beltman that DeGroot is
to expressly benefit from the sub-contractor's bid contract to the general contractor. Despite
DeGroot's assertions to the contrary, "the intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in
the contract itself. Idaho Power Co. 140 Idaho at 112,90 P.3d at 337; quoting Adkison COlp. v.
American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341,344 (1984). In P artoUf, this Court noted

that, "Partout fails to point to any specific written contract or to set forth the terms of an oral

"4

45

R. Vol. 4. pp. 604-607
Id.
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contract showing an intent that the contract benefit Partout." ld, at pp. 687, 775. Here, DeGroot
can only point to identification of the "DeGroot Dairy" being written on Standley's bid contract.
There is no other wording within the bid contract upon which DeGroot can ground his third party
beneficiary claim.

In Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 97 P.3d 439 (2004), a lender

involved with parties developing real property required personal guarantees by the principals for
the developers. The contract stated that the personal guarantees were to "' ... payoff M&D Trust
.... " ld. at pp. 446, 579. Despite the party being expressly identified and a purpose given for the

personal guarantees to payoff that party, this Court denied the allegation of third party
beneficiary status stating, " ... under the clear terms of the agreement M&D was not an intended
beneficiary of any promise on the part of Thomas and Clegg." Jd.
Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals has squarely addressed the issue of whether a project
ovmer directly benefits from a contract, or merely has an incidental benefit in the contract
between a sub contractor and the general contractor. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho
702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct. App. 2004). References to the "DeGroot Dairy" on the bid contract or on
invoicing from the job show nothing more than DeGroot being an incidental beneficiary of the
Standley - Beltman contract. Similarly, the fact that materials purchased by the subcontractor
that went into construction of a cabin on land ovmed by Nelson, did not create a direct third party
beneficial interest for the owner, Nelson, in the contract between the subcontractor and the
general contractor.

Jd.

Identifying the owner by name in the bid contract or on invoicing

documents for the job fails to meet the requirements of Idaho law for establishment of a third
party beneficiary interest for DeGroot. The district court found the Nelson decision citations to 9
Corbin on Contracts §779D (1979) and to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §302. illus. 19
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(1981) dispositive on the point of law that a project O\\'l1er has no direct cause of action against a
sub-contractor, " ... in the absence of clear words to the contrary. ,,46 Further, DeGroot cites no
authority for the proposition that the manure handling equipment was under warranty and
Standley's performing warranty work somehow creates a third party beneficiary interest for
DeGroot in the Standley-Beltman contract. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to
Standley on the third party beneficiary claim should be upheld.
3. DeGroot cannot maintain warranty claims against Standley as the
parties were never in a contractual relationship.
Express \Varranties.

Idaho's version of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
28-2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,
Description, Sample. - (1) Express warranties by the seller are
created as follows:
(a) i\ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made pa..'1:y of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods
shall COnfOffi1 to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that

46

March L 2005 hearing, pp. 66 - 68; citing, Nelson at pp. 709, 1099 for the propositions that: (1) The
OVI'l1er is neither a creditor beneficiary nor a donee beneficiary: the benefit that he receiYes from
perfonnance must be regarded as merely incidentaL 9 Corbin on Contracts §779D ( 979) and (2) A
contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts with A to supply lumber needed for the building. C
is an incidental beneficiary of B's promise. and B is an incidental beneficiary of C's promise to pay A
for the building. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §302, illus. 19 (1981).
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the seller use fonnal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or
that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.
Despite affinnation that no contract existed between DeGroot and Standley, DeGroot
argues that Standley made express warranties to DeGroot regarding the manure handling system.
Paragraph 41 of DeGroot's Second Amended Complaint is the only allegation set forth in the
pleadings suggesting the creation of an express warranty. The further suggestion that no contract
need be required in order to create an express warranty is contradicted by the statutory language
requiring that an express warranty under Idaho's codification of the DCC must be "part of the
basis of the bargain." In the context of personal injury damages, "DCC warranties apply only to
those in privity of contract with the manufacturer and those who qualify as third party
beneficiaries of the underlying sales contract, as defmed by I.C. §28-2-318."
Oakfabco, Inc. 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1998); citing, Oats v.

"Vissal1_~1otor

Puckett v.

Corp. in USA,

126 Idaho 162, 169,879 P.2d 1095,1102 (1999).
Although DeGroot does not seek personal mJury damages, the statute is explicit
regarding how a seller creates an express \varranties. It would make little commercial sense to
permit a cause of action by a buyer against a seller for an express warranty in the absence of a
contract. Further, the comments to I.C. §28-2-313 \vould not discuss the policy considerations
between allowing for the creation of express warranties versus the ability to contractually
disclaim said \varranties, if privity of contract between buyer and seller were not a prerequisite
for assertion of an express warranty. Jensen v. Seigel c'1ohile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668
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P.2d 65 (1983); citing, Official COlmnent 4 to I.e. §28-2-313.

If there is no contract, there can

be no "basis of the bargain" upon which the alleged express \varranty was created.
Further analysis of statements made by Standley employees, occurring at trade fairs years
prior to construction of the dairy, or at the dairy after completion of construction and start-up of
dairy operations, are not determinative of whether DeGroot can maintain a breach of express
warranty against Standley. "The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that an express warranty
arises only because the warrantor has willed it into being by making the requisite affirmation as
part of the contract to which it is an adjunct."

Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Williams-

Hayward Protective Coatings, Inc., 2005 WL782698, (N.D. Ill. Eastern Div.), 57 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d 136; citing, Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 508-09, 127 Ill. Dec. 5, 532
N .E.2d 834 (Ill. 1988). As the Illinois court noted in Canadian Pacific Railway Co., "in general,
because an express warranty is a creature of contract a party must have privity to the contract
before bringing a breach of express warranty claim." Id. Here, because of the lack

evidence

offered by DeGroot that Standley did anything that became a basis of a bargain, the proper
analysis begins and ends with privity of contract. DeGroot admits that there was no contract
with Standley and that Standley was a subcontractor for Beltman on the dairy project. For the
reasons discussed supra, DeGroot is not a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract
made to Beltman. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim
for breach of express warranty should be upheld.
Implied warranties.
DeGroot assigns as an issue on appeal whether summary judgment was property granted
by the district court below on the claims made against Standley for breach of the implied
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warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. DeGroot cites to I.e. §28-2314(1) for the proposition that an implied warranty of merchantability arises in a sale of goods
unless excluded or modified by the parties to the sale. As to the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, the statute provides:
Implied \Varranty - Fitness for particular purpose. - v,'here the
seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section,
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
I.e. §28-2-315.

However, the correct analysis centers on whether DeGroot can make a proper claim
directly against Standley upon the implied warranty or merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose. The answer is no. The reason is that Idaho law is clear that privity of contract is
necessary to maintain a contract action to recover for economic loss arising from breach on an
implied warranty. Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1999).
The facts of the Ramerth case are analogous to this appeal. Morris, the owner of an
airplane, hired Hart to overhaul the aircraft's engine. !d. at p. 850, 196

Morris later sold the

airplane to Ramerth. Id. Ran1erth did not know Hart and never had any business connections or
dealings with him. Id. at 851, 197. After Ramerth purchased the airplane he discovered that
Hart's overhaul work was defective and caused damage to both the airplane's engine and air
frame. !d. at p. 850, 196. Ramerth and Morris jointly agreed to pursue an action against Hart.

Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hart because Ramerth's breach of contract
claim lacked privity of contract. Id. Morris then assigned his claims against Hart to Ramerth.
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Id. Hart eventually obtained complete summary judgment on all claims. Id. On appeal, Morris
and Ramerth argued that the requirement of privity of contract in breach of implied warranty
actions should be abolished. Id.
This court noted that Morris did not have any damages he could claim arising from Hart's
overhaul of the engine, as the plane worked satisfactorily during his ownership and the
malfunction occurred after he sold it to Ramerth. Similarly, Beltman has no damages to claim
arising from Standley's work on the DeGroot dairy as Beltrnan was paid in full by DeGroot,
including the work performed by Standley.47 Even in settling the DeGroot action against it,
Beltman did not have to pay any actual monetary amount. 48 Thus, analogous to Ramerth, even if
Standley breached its bid contract with Beltman, Beltman incurred no actual damages and
therefore, by assignment to DeGroot, Beltman conveyed no compensable loss to DeGroot.
DeGroot has no contractual privity with Standley.
DeGroot like Ramerth, argues that the requirement of contractual privity should be
abolished in an action upon a contract to recover economic loss for breach of implied walTanties.
In Ramerth, the history of the contractual privity requirement in Idaho jurisprudence was set
forth, complete with reference to those instances over the past 30+ years where the doctrine was
questioned but never abolished. The doctrine remains part of Idaho's jurisprudence and its stare
decisis value should not be set aside. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley

on DeGroot's implied warranty theories should be upheld.

4"
48

R., Vol. 5, pp. 796; 879 - 888
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4. DeGroot cannot maintain a claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing against Standley.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant in contract, not tort,
from which only contractual damages can be asserted. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods. Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). In paragraph 60 of the Second Amended

Complaint, DeGroot alleges that Standley violated, nullified, and/or significantly impaired the
benefits provided to DeGroot under contractual relationship and thus materially breached its
implied obligations to act in good faith towards DeGroot. 49 As argued supra, Charles DeGroot
admitted that he did not have a contract with Standley. Thus, in the absence of contract, there
can be no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Huyett v. Idaho State University,
140 Idaho 904,952, 104 P.3d 946, 910 (2004), holding, "the university could not have breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to a non-existent contract."
DeGroot did not contest the fact that no contract between the parties existed, but asserted
that as a third party beneficiary, DeGroot could recover under the implied covenant, yet cited to
no authority for such a proposition. 50 However, third party beneficiaries are only bound to the
extent contract terms apply to him.

Tolley v. Thi Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004).

Standley does not concede that its bid contract to Beltman was intended to directly benefit
DeGroot, but merely analogizes to Idaho law illustrating how third party beneficiaries are limited
when stating a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lewis v. CEDU
Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 139,15 P.3d 1147 (2000). As argued supra, DeGroot, at

best, was an incidental beneficiary of Standley's bid contract to Beltman.

49
50

R. Vol. 1, p. 73
at p. 197
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As an incidental

beneficiary only, DeGroot lacks third party beneficiary status and the claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails.

Therefore, the granting of summary

judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing should be upheld.
5. DeGroot cannot maintain a claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act against Standley.

Standley's arguments set forth belo'w in support of summary judgment on DeGroot's
claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act are two-fold. First, due to the lack of a
contractual sales transaction between the parties there wasn't anything that occurred between the
parties that would be subject to the Act. Standley's second argument is that paragraph 66 of
DeGroot's Second Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act, because the allegation contained therein did not meet the requisite
element that the goods were of another quality of standard than represented. 51 A violation of the
Act can only occur if " ... goods and services are represented to be of a particular quality and
standard and, they are of another." In Re Edwards, 233 B.R. 461,471-76 (Bkrtcy. D. Ida. 1999).
DeGroot's response was to agree that a contract is necessary for a claim under the Act,
Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785,788,640 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1982), and again assert that it was

a third paIty beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to Beltman and that there is no Idaho
authority on point as to whether a third party beneficiary can state a cause of action under the
Act. 52 On this issue, Standley continues to assert that DeGroot is not a third party beneficiary of
its bid contract to Beltman, therefore DeGroot cannot state a claim for a yiolation of the Act.

51

5:

R . \'. o.1 1, pp. -'''
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Jd., at pp. 198-199
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However, DeGroot also argues that. even if it is not a third party beneficiary, it is still
permissible to state a claim for violation of the Act because Standley attended trade shows and
held itself out as having particular expertise and knowledge of Houle equipment. 53
DeGroot cites no authority for its proposition that, absent a contract, a prospective
buyer's attendance at a trade show and speaking to a vendor about equipment gives rise to an
action under the Act. As argued by Standley, the problem with this assertion lies in the lack of
proof as to what exactly was discussed between DeGroot and Standley at the trade show. Here,
DeGroot failed to provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his opposition to
Standley's summary judgment. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on
DeGroot's claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act should be upheld.
6. DeGroot has no contract upon which a claim of rescission against
Standley can be made.

The remedy of rescission under the U.e.C. is only available to a party to a contract. Here
again, DeGroot's admission of no contract with Standley precludes recovery on this claim. Even
the statutory definitions of "buyer" and "seller" under I.e. §28-2-201(1) contemplate a
contractual relationship.54 DeGroot then resorts to the assertion that it purchased the manure
handling equipment from Standley, an authorized dealer of Houle equipment. 55 This argument is
analogous to DeGroot's third party beneficiary theory, as it is offered as a means to avoid the
basic requirement that a contract exist between the parties before a proper claim is stated. As
Standley argued before the district court, there is simply no evidence in the record establishing

53
54

55

Id.. at p. 199
Id., at p. 123; citing, I.e. §28-2-201(l)
Id.. at p. 19]
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that DeGroot made direct purchases of Houle equipment from Standley, i. e.: no purchase invoice
and no proof of direct payment. 56
Further missing from DeGroof s argument is the fact that the claim for rescission is
subject to the EC.C. 's statute of frauds which provides:
28-2-201. Formal requirements - Statute of Frauds. - (1) Except
as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.

I.C. §28-2-201(l), emphasis added.
As argued by Standley before the district court, DeGroot can't be a buyer in order to
assert a right of rescission because there is no direct contract between them and in pursuing that
line

reasoning, DeGroot contradicts its position taken on all other issues on appeaL i.e., that it

is a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to Beltman.
For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim for
rescission of contract should be upheld.

';6
•

Id at p. "'60
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B. THE ASSIGNMENT FROM BELTMAl'\f TO DEGROOT DOES NOT
PROVIDE DEGROOT WITH THE SAME DAMAGES DEGROOT
INITIALLY ALLEGED DIRECTLY AGAINST STANDLEY.
1. Standard of Review.

As Standley was granted complete summary judgment on the Beltman claims assigned to
DeGroot, the standard of review set forth supra applies and need not be restated here.

2. Introduction.
LLiJ:ter DeGroot failed to prevail on the claims directly asserted against Standley, DeGroot
settled its litigation against Beltman, took an assignment of Beltman's third party claims against
Standley, and substituted into the litigation as a Third Party Plaintiff.57 It is important to note
that the third party claims Beltman asserted against Standley and assigned to DeGroot are
analogous to the original claims DeGroot attempted to directly assert against Standley. It is
further important to note that in reaching settlement with DeGroot, Beltman (1) did not have to
pay any monetary amount, and (2) DeGroot gave Beltman a Satisfaction of Judgment which \vas
filed with the district court. 58 In terms of asserting damages, Beltman's damages cannot be the
same as DeGroof s because Beltman operates a construction company and is not in the business
of O\vning or operating a dairy; therefore, any special damages Beltman alleges to have incurred
and passed to DeGroot by assignment, are not the same special damages DeGroot allegedly
incurred. 59 Lastly, in regard to indemnity, Beltman never stated such a claim against Stanley in
its Third Party Complaint or First Amended Third Party Complaint.

57
58
59

R. Vol. 4, pp. 612-613; footnote #1, Order on Summary Judgment
R. Vol. 5, p. 796: R. Vol. 3, pp. 525-526
Regarding implied warranties, Beltman has not made a claim for the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance against Standley for its work installing the manure handling equipment. Idaho has
recognized this implied warranty. Hoffinal1 v. Simplot Aviation. Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 36, 539 P.2d 584,
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3. Summar\' judgment was properly granted to Standlev on DeGroot's
third party claim for breach of express warranty.

The same statutory framework for creation of an express warranty, namely,

I.e. §28-2-

313 discussed supra applies, the only distinction being that DeGroot is no longer attempting to
assert a claim for breach of express warranty directly against Standley, but through assignment,
steps into Beltman's shoes and asserts Beltman's claim, if any, for breach of express warranty
against Standley. Standley argued before the district court that the purpose of the third party
action was to allow the defendant (Beltman) in the first-party action to attempt to transfer its
alleged liability to the plaintiff (DeGroot) on to the third-party defendant (Standley). The impact
of the filing of a Satisfaction of Judgment arising from the settlement of the DeGroot claims
against Beltman is dispositive because the Satisfaction of Judgment acts to satisfy any rights
assigned by Beltman to DeGroot. 6o A contract made prior to judgment and then ruled on is
reduced to the judgment, i.e., "when a contract has become merged in a valid judgment, all
possibility of its revival is irretrievably lost." Tfloods v. Locke et al., 49 Idaho 486, 491-92, 289
P.61O, 611 (1930). The filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment demonstrates that there are no
damages in the third party case assigned from Beltman to DeGroot.
Assuming arguendo, that the assignment from Beltman to DeGroot and subsequent
Satisfaction of Judgment fail to establish that there are no damages in the third party case for
DeGroot to pursue, the facts and law discussed herein regarding express walTanty still fail to
accommodate the third party action.

DeGroot, through assigmnent from Beltman, must

demonstrate that Standley made affInnations of fact or promise to Beltman that became a basis

60

588 (1975). As Beltman did not state this claim, DeGroot did not acquire a claim for breach of the
implied warranty of workmanlike performance through the assignment of Beltman' s claims.
R. Vol. 3, p. 510
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of the bargain between Standley and BeItman.

A seller's commendation of the goods or

statements as to value of the goods, as well as statements of puffery, are not express warranties.
Jensen v. Siegel A10bile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189,668 P.2d 65 (1983); I.e. §28-2-313(2).
DeGroot, standing in B eItm an , s shoes, can only reference two items in support of the
contention that Standley made express warranties about the manure handling equipment and
installation. First are statements attributed to a Standley employee made to Earnest DeGroot
concerning maintenance of the system, but these statements occurred after the bid contract had
been accepted and after the equipment had been installed at the dairy.6l Second are statements
attributed to Kurt Standley made to Charles DeGroot at a trade show in Tulare, California in
1999. 62 These statements did not become a basis of the bargain because neither were made by
Standley to BeItman, were not made at or around the time of contracting, and were made after
completion of installation of the equipment. Even if DeGroot had established that the statements
were in fact made, there is no evidence that the statements 'were more than mere puffery.
A buyer carries the burden of proof to establish the existence of facts that give rise to an
express warranty; a buyer also must carry the burden of proof that there was a breach of an
express warranty.63 BeItman lacks facts to establish that Standley made express warranties about
the manure handling equipment or the installation of the equipment.

Through assignment,

DeGroot received nothing better factually than what existed when DeGroot directly asserted a
breach of express warranties against Standley. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to

R. Vol. 5, p. 798
at p. 799; see also, R. Vol. 2, p. 213
63ICS::')8')~1'"
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Standley on Beltman's third party claim for breach of express warranty, assigned to DeGroot,
should be upheld.
4. Summary judgment was properly granted to Standley on DeGroot's
third party claim for breach of implied warranties.
It is problematic for DeGroot that the district court's ruling on summary judgment on the

third party claims was premised on the finding that DeGroot's causes of action (received through
assignment from Beltman) were never liquidated. Damages were never liquidated because there
was never a finding of fault against Beltman on DeGroot's claims and causes of action. Nor was
there any determination of apportionment of fault between Beltman and Standley on Beltman's
claims and causes of action. The causes of action were never liquidated because there was never
a finding apportioning fault between Beltman and Standley.64 DeGroot steps in to Beltman's
shoes through the assignment obtained from Beltman; however, if liquidated damages provide
the soles for those shoes, DeGroot's bare feet are touching the ground.
DeGroot argues that Beltman relied upon Standley's expertise for installation of the
manure handling system and that this reliance precludes summary judgment for Standley on the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 65 DeGroot does not devote any further
authority or argument to the implied warranty of merchantability in the context of Beltman's
assignment of that cause of action and DeGroot has therefore waived the implied warranty of
merchantability. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). DeGroot also overlooks
the fact that Charles DeGroot told Beltman to use Standley as the sub-contractor for the manure
handling equipment thus, Beltman did as instructed and did not unilaterally select Standley for

64
65

October 21,2011 hearing, pp. 97-99: Appellant's Brief, p. 27
Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-31
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the job based upon Standley's experience or expertise. Beltman, as a buyer under the U.C.c.,
did not rely upon Standley, rather DeGroot told Beltman to use Standley. Duffin v. Idaho Crop
Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 1011, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995) (no implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose where there was no evidence that the buyer relied on the seller's
judgment to select appropriate goods for a particular purpose).
DeGroot looks to the assigned claims from Beltman in an attempt to boot strap itself into
an exception to the vertical privity rule when seeking economic loss on a breach of implied
warranty. In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F.Supp.2d 659, (N.D. Ill. 2005), a similar
argument was made by a buyer and addressed by the federal district court. 66 Caterpillar used
steel manufactured by Usinor for heavy duty dump truck bodies, the steel proved to be defective
for the specified use, and Caterpillar initiated litigation which, in part, alleged breaches of
express and implied warranties regarding the steel. 67

Caterpillar lacked vertical contractual

privity with Usinor. 68 Caterpillar argued that an exception to the contractual privity rule existed
because it gave Usinor specifications for its truck bodies and because Usinor was aware of
Caterpillar's uses and requirements for the stee1. 69
In addressing Caterpillar's arguments for exception to the rule of contractual privity the
federal district court questioned whether such an exception even continued to exist under Illinois
law and when addressing the merits of Caterpillar's argument noted that its Complaint failed to

66
67
~8

o
69

The Illinois commercial code statute for implied warranties, 810 ILCS 5/2-315, (fomlerly cited as IL
ST CH 26 ~2-3 15) reads identically to I.e. §28-2-315.
Jd., at p. 663
Jd., at p. 676
Jd.
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state that Usinor custom made the steel specifically for Caterpillar. 7o

The court made this

distinction because the line of authority relied upon by Caterpillar for exception to contractual
privity contains a, " ... common thread ... that the buyer told the manufacturer of its needs before
the product \vas built.,,71 The court noted, "here it \vas the other \vay around: Caterpillar told
Usinor what it needed after Usinor told Caterpillar about the properties of ti"'1e ... steel in the
1998 and 2000 sales presentations."

72

The court further noted that, "Caterpillar does not allege

that after it gave Usinor the specifications, Usinor specifically designed the (steel) that it sold to
CMSA and Westech for use in the truck bodies. ... U sinor appears to have provided a mere
component to CMSA and We stech: it was CMSA and Westech who designed a finished product
for Caterpillar, not Usinor." 73
Applying the Caterpillar facts to Beltman's claims assigned to DeGroot, Beltman did not
allege that Houle custom made the manure handling equipment for the DeGroot dairy project or
even that Standley informed Houle of special custom requirements for the equipment to be
installed at the DeGroot dairy. Nor does Beltman allege that it gave Standley specifications and
that Standley specifically designed the manure handling system. Charles DeGroot testified that
Beltman did not even provide the plans for the dairy because DeGroot had earlier obtained the
plans from Vance Construction, the design-build contractor who did not get the job. 74 Standley,
analogous to Usinor in the Caterpillar case, provided a mere component to Beltman in the form

70

71

-~
I~

,4

Jd.
Jd.
ld.
ld.
R. Vol. 1, p. 101; R. Vol. 2, p. 209
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of the equipment manufactured by Houle and the installation of that equipment at the DeGroot
dairy.
Beltman's claim for breach of implied warranty, assigned to DeGroot, fails because
(1) Beltman' s damages were never liquidated, thus through the assignment DeGroot did not
receive anything upon which to recover damages against Standley, and (2) Beltman has not come
forward with any evidence more than a mere scintilla upon which to support its claim that it
relied upon Standley's experience and expertise for the purchase and installation of the manure
handling equipment at the DeGroot dairy.

Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to

Standley on Beltman's third party claim for breach of the implied covenant of fitness for a
particular purpose, assigned to DeGroot, should be upheld.
5. Summary judgment was properly granted to Standlev on DeGroot's
third party claim for rescission of contract.
DeGroot's attempt to bring a direct claim against Standley for rescission failed due to
lack of contractual privity. DeGroot then took an assignment from Beltman on Beltman's third
party claim stated against Standley for rescission.

Although DeGroot argues the law of

rescission when addressing DeGroot's failed attempt to make a direct claim against Standley, in
the assignment of the third party claim, DeGroot's argument focuses upon laches and does not
attempt to apply the fact to the law regarding rescission.
Pursuant to I.e. §28-2-603 a buyer may revoke acceptance of goods if the nonconformity of the goods substantially impairs their value, and if the buyer has accepted the goods
on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and it has not seasonably
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been cured. 75 Acceptance can only be revoked within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers
or should have discovered the ground for the revocation. 76 A buyer rejects non-conforming
goods by taking affirmative action to avoid acceptance and by notifying the seller of the rejection
within a reasonable time. 77
Through Standley's bid contract to Beltman, the parties contracted for the purchase/sale
and installation of the manure handling equipment at the DeGroot dairy therefore meeting the
definitional requirements under the D.e.C. for "buyer" and "seller." In the context of Beltman's
third party claim for rescission against Standley, the district court held that the claim of
rescission was not brought in a timely manner. The claim of rescission that is relevant is not
DeGroot's notice to Standley in June, 2001, as the letter conveying that notice was for DeGroot's
direct claim for rescission against Standley. 78 The basis for the district cOUli's holding focuses
upon notice, if any, given by Beltman to Standley for rescission of Standley'S bid contract.
DeGroot argues that "Beltman asserted its claim for rescission against Standley," but fails to cite
to anything in the record substantiating this proposition. 79 It is dispositive that Beltman's Third
Party Complaint was filed nearly five years after completion of the DeGroot dairy and Beltman
made no attempt, in writing or otherwise, to notify Standley of a rescission of Standley's bid
contract prior to filing its Third Party Complaint.
Lacking is any evidence of Beltman taking affirmative action to avoid acceptance, and by
notifying the seller of the rejection within a reasonable time, as required by I.e. §28-2-618. This

75
76
-r-;

78
79

I.e. §28-2-603(l)(a); Beal v. Grifjin, 123 Idaho 445, 449,849 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1993).
I.e. §28-2-608(2)
LC. §28-2-608
R. Vol. 2, pp. 343-349
Appellant's Brief, p. 3 1
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is the basis for the district court's holding that the claim for rescission was not brought within a
reasonable time. 8o Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the laches argument initially advanced by
Standley is not the same argument used later when Standley again sought summary judgment on
BeItman's rescission claim assigned to DeGroot. Therefore, the granting of slLmmary judgment
to Standley on BeItman's third party claim for rescission of contract, assigned to DeGroot,
should be upheld.
6. Summary judgment was properlY granted to Standley on DeGroot's
third party claim for breach of the implied coyenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

BeItman's third party action against Standley included a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The claim was assigned by BeItman to DeGroot, but the
analysis requires application of facts to law concerning the dealings between BeItman and
Standley in order to determine whether DeGroot obtained any viable claim through assignment.
As Standley argued before the district COlIli, a violation of the covenant occurs only when a party
violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. 81 Idaho First Nat 'I. Bank
v. Bliss Valley Food, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841 (1991). Beltman has presented no

evidence on Standley'S conduct which allegedly violated, nullified, or significantly impaired any
benefit BeItman was to receive as a resuIt of Standley'S bid contract. The undisputed facts show
that Beltman was paid in full on its contract with DeGroot and that no benefit of the
BeltnwnlStandley contract was nullified or significantly impaired.

In fact, Beltman was not

required to return any money to DeGroot and DeGroot never requested that Beltman return any

80

81

Appellant's Brief. p. 3 L September 7, 2011 Motion for Summary Judgment. pp.70-71
R. Vol. 5, p. 779
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monetary amount. 82 Nor did DeGroot retain any money from Beltman as a result of Standley's
work installing the manure handling equipment. 83
The stipulated judgment Beltman entered into with DeGroot resolving the litigation
DeGroot brought against Beltman also fails to yield a basis upon which Beltman can claim that
its contract with Standley was violated, nullified or significantly impaired due to the lack of any
monetary amount being paid by Beltman to DeGroot. Beltman has testified that it is not out any
money as a result of Standley's conduct, or as a result of the functioning of the manure handling
equipment. 84 Beltman has failed to rebut Standley's motion for summary judgment due to the
lack of evidence of violation, nullification or significant impainnent of Beltman' s expectations
under the Standley bid contract. Further, on appeal, DeGroot has waived this issue by failing to
provide authority or argument specifically supporting the validity of Beltman's third party claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which it took by way of assignment.

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996).
Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on Beltman's third party claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, assigned to DeGroot, should be upheld.

7. SummarY judgment was properlv granted to Standley on DeGroot's
third partv claim for indemnification.
On September 7, 2011, the district court heard oral argun1ent on Standley'S motion for
partial sUll1illary judgment and motion in limine. 85

Standley's partial summary judgment

addressed the DeGroot third party claims obtained from Beltman through assigmnent for breach

s-- 11Td., at p.,79')~
79-)
11Td ., at p.!
84 la.,
T '
at p. 796
,
85 September 7, 20 I 1 hearing, pp. 1-80
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RESPOl'i~ENrS

BRIEF - 31.

of express warranty, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim for rescission. 86
Beltman never stated a claim for indemnity against Standley. Standley's motion in limine was
filed as a formality to confirm the district court's prior rulings that DeGroot could not maintain
direct causes of action against Standley, thereby seeking to prohibit the introduction of any
evidence irrelevant to the then remaining claims DeGroot obtained from Beltman through
assignment. 87 During oral argument on the motion in limine, the issue arose as to whether
Beltman's claims against Standley constituted a claim for indemnity arising from Beltman's
relationship with DeGroot and the parties requested additional briefing on the indenmity issue. 88
The remedy of indenmity can arise expressly by contract, be implied from contract, or
arise through the common law. Here, Standley's bid contract to BeItman does not contain an
express written provision for contractual indemnity. Nor can contractual indenmity be implied
from Standley's bid contract to Beltman. If a claim for indeITL'lity was possessed by Beltman, it
must arise from the common law as an equitable remedy.
Indenmity between tortfeasors has been defined as:
(1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third for the same harm
and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to
indenmity from the other for if the other would be unjustly
enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability ....

Restatement (Second) Torts §886B, Indenmity Between Tortfeasors, 1979, emphasis added
Restitution is the basis for equitable indenmity. Id., at Comment C; see also, Chenery v.
Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 751 (1988). The distinction between contribution
86
go
88

R . \"1 01. )-, p. ~'O
/I

Id., at pp. 862-965
Id., at p. 891
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and indemnity has also been clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court's characterization to think of
indemnity as a claim for 100% reimbursement, while contribution is for partial reimbursement.
Chenel)i, at p. 284, 754, citing, Stephenson v.

~McClure,

606 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Mo. App.

1980).89 In order for equitable indemnity to apply, DeGroot must be able to show that both
Beltman and Standley are liable in tort to DeGroot for the same harm. DeGroot can't make this
threshold showing, as the law of the case has established that there are no direct (contract based)
claims against Standley, nor has DeGroot stated a claim for negligence directly against Standley.
In addition, DeGroot can't meet the sho\ving of unjust enrichment. Beltman's discharge of the
liability alleged by DeGroot against it did not unjustly enrich Standley, as DeGroot could not
maintain any direct claims or causes of action against Standley for the reasons set f011h supra. 90
Even though DeGroot can't make the threshold shov,ling, further argument and authority is
provided on equitable indemnity. The prima facie elements are: (1) an indemnity relationship,
(2) actual liability of an indem..nitee to the third party, and (3) a reasonable settlement amount.
Chene/y, at 284, 754; citing, Williams v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 292, 442 P.2d 178 (1968). "An

indemnity relationship betvveen tortfeasors exists when the parties share a common liability for
the same harm." ..Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 858 P.2d 822 (et. App. 1993); citing,
Restatement (Second) Torts §886B, (1979). DeGroot must point to a common liability for the
same hann that Beltman shared with Standley. The record is clear, Beltman does not assel1 any
damages different from DeGroot's damages. The damages BeItman seeks derive directly from
DeGroot's contractual damages against Beltman. Beltman does not have any damages in excess

89

90

Indemnity is also distinguished from subrogation, see, R. Vol 5, p. 895, !viay Trucking v. International
Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 32 L 543 P .2d ]159,1161 (1975).
See also footnote #3, R. Vol. 5. p. 896
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of DeGroot's and DeGroot's ability to make a direct claim against Standley fails due to the lack
of privity of contract. Thus, the assignment to DeGroot of Beltman's claims against Standley
fails to convey a common liability between Beltman and Standley arising from the dairy project.
The second element of actual liability of the indemnitee (Beltman) to the third party
(DeGroot) does not exist, as Beltman never paid, nor will it ever pay, any monetary amount to
DeGroot. 91

Beltman will never have to pay DeGroot, due to the satisfaction of judgment it

received from DeGroot. Issuance of a satisfaction of judgment, " ... ends the case and dismisses
the parties from the jurisdiction of the court." Dahlstrom v. Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 11 0 P.
243 (1910).
The third element of a "reasonable settlement amount" is also mlssmg, preventing
DeGroot from obtaining equitable indemnity through assignment of Beltman's claims against
Standley. The record shows DeGroot's position to be:
Here, Beltman is not asserting it is entitled to damages in excess of
DeGroot's damages and Standley camlOt seriously argue
othervv-ise. The damages Beltman seeks, including damages
relating to repair costs, system improvement costs and future repair
costs, derive directly from DeGroot's contractual claims against
Beltman.
R. Vol. 5, p. 839; Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc.' s Motion in
Limine, p.3.
As DeGroot admits that Beltman has no independent damage claims against Standley, the
only reasonable settlement amount of Beltman's claims against Standley is $0. As Beltman did
not pay, nor will ever pay any amount to DeGroot, the stipulated amount benNeen the parties is

91

Id. at p. 897, for further references in the record supporting why Beltman has no actual liability as
indelllilitee to DeGroot as a third party.
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fictitious. Beltman therefore was not acting in good faith making a settlement offer under a
reasonable belief that it was necessary to its protection. This is llilother reason why equitable
indemnity is unavailable to Beltman and why DeGroot did not receive a cognizable claim
through the assignment of Beltman's claims against Standley.
Lastly, DeGroot looks to the third party practice in the litigation below as a means to
justify the end result that Beltman has no damages in excess of DeGroot's damages, or that
Beltman's risk of paying damages did not arise until DeGroot sued it. 92 LR.C.P. 14(a) provides:
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a
third-party plaintiff may cause to be served a sunm10ns and
complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.

LR.C.P. 14(a), emphasis added.
DeGroot further states that, " ... the very essence of third party pleading is that the third
party defendant's liability be derivative of, or secondary to, that of the defendant in the main
action. 93 DeGroot sued Beltman and Beltman brought a third party action against Standley. The
reference to "the third party defendant's liability" can only mean Standley. Standley'S liability
must be derivative or secondary to Beltman's liability in the main action of DeGroot v. Beltman.
However, Beltman's liability was never adjudicated to finality, nor did Beltman pursue its claims
against Standley to finality. DeGroot seems to argue that LR.C.P. 14(a) allmys it to disregard
that Beltman has no damages in excess of that claimed by DeGroot and the third party pleadings
in effect become a conduit for another direct assertion by DeGroot of its damages claims against

92

O~

Appellant's Brief, p. 34
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Standley. The definition of assignment has been the subject of review by the Idaho Supreme
Court:
"Assigmnent" is defined as "the transfer of rights or property."
Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed. 1999). i\merican
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines "assignment' as:
... a transfer of property or some other right from one person (the
'assignor') to another (the 'assignee'), which comers a complete
and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. An
assignment is a contract between the assi gnor and the assignee, and
is interpreted or construed in accordance to rules of contract
construction. Ordinarily, the word 'assigmnent' is limited in its
application to a transfer of intangible rights, including contractual
rights, choses in action, and rights in or connected with property,
as distinguished from transfer of the property itself. According to
the Restatement of Contracts, an assigmnent of a right is a
manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of
which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is
extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to
such perfonnance.
Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho Stare Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 125-25,90 P.3d 346,
351 (2007); citing, Black's Law Dictionary and 6 io\.l11.Jur.2d Assigmnent § 1 (1999).

In order to detennine the intent of the assigmnent a court looks to the contract benveen
the assignor and assignee. !d. at pp. 126, 351 Behman is designated as the assignor and DeGroot
the assignee. 94 "An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action. and the assignee becomes the real party in
interest. "Jd., citing, McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289,291-92 (1973).
Thus, only DeGroot, as assignee, can prosecute Beltman's claims, as assignor, against Standley.
LR.C.P. 14(a) does not change the basic definitions or concept of assigmnent. The one-way

94

R. Vol. 5, pp. 883 - 884
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direction of the assignment that occUt"Ted in the litigation below is further supported by the
following:
To be effective, an assignment must be completed \vith a delivery,
and the delivery must confer a complete and present right on the
transferee. The assignor must not retain control over the property
assigned, the authority to collect, or the power to revoke.
ld., citing, 6 /\m.Jur.2d Assignment § 132 (1999).

The fact Beltman doesn't assert any damages

ill

excess of DeGroof s, and that the

damages have always been DeGroot's, conveys nothing to DeGroot to enforce against Standley
pursuant to the assignment from Beltman. DeGroot, as assignee, can only assert Beltman's
claims, as assignor. The assignment does not enable DeGroot to pursue its claims anew despite
the lack of privity.

For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on

DeGroot's third party claim for indemnification should be upheld.

8. DeGroot cannot recover incidental or consequential damages through
assignment of ReItman's third party claims against Standlev.
DeGroot cites to

I.e. §28-2-712(2), §28-2-713(1) and §28-2-715 in support of the

argument that incidental and consequential damages are recoverable against Standley.95
However, the "buyer" in reference to these provisions of Idaho's statutory codification of the

u .C.C. is Beltman, not DeGroot, as DeGroot has no direct contractual causes of action against
Standley due to lack of privity.

Thus, through assignment of Beltman's third party claims,

DeGroot must establish that Beltman incurred incidental and consequential damages.

The

special damages originally identified by DeGroot against Standley are not the same damages that
Beltman allegedly possessed against Standley. The incidental and consequential damages cited
95

Appellant's Brief at pp. 36-37
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by DeGroot arose from DeGroot's claims originally asserted against Standley, which Beltman
never possessed nor asserted against Standley.

Therefore, the assigmnent from Beltman to

DeGroot did not breathe new life into DeGroot's attempt to claim these alleged damages against
Standley.
C.

STANDLEY WAS PROPERLY AWARDED
COSTS IN THE LITIGATION BELOW.

ATTOR~EY

FEES AND

DeGroot assigns error to the district court's awarding of attorney fees and costs to
Standley, arguing that, if there is no privity of contract between DeGroot and Standley, it is
patently unfair to then award Standley its fees and costs under I.e. §12-120(3).96 However, this
question has been addressed and there is authority upon which an award of attorney fees and
costs under I.e. 12-120(3) can be made in the absence of a contract when the case involved a
commercial transaction. Blimka v. 1I1y Web FVholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594,599
(2007). The lack of contractual privity does not prevent Standley, the prevailing party in the
consolidated litigation below involving a commercial transaction, to be awarded its attorney fees
pursuant to I.e. §12-120(3).97
D. STANDLEY IS ENTITLED TO ITS

ATTOR~EY

FEES ON APPEAL.

Standley believes that it will prevail on the issues argued above and that it is entitled to
its attorney's fees pursuant to I.e. §12-120(3) and I. A. R. 41. If summary judgment is upheld for
Standley on (1) DeGroot's affirmative claims, (2) DeGroot's third party beneficiary claim,
(3) DeGroot's third party claims against Standley received through assignment from Beltman,

96
97

Appellant's Brief at p. 38
R. Vol. 6, pp. 1106 - 1115
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and (4) no basis for indemnity exists, then Standley will have prevailed, which would pennit it to
recovery its attorney fees on appeal.

v.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Standley respectfully requests this Court uphold the decisions
of the district court as argued above.
DATED this 11th day of April, 2013.
Respectfully submitted,
SASSER & INGLIS, P.e.
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